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KENTUCKY LAw JourmAL
INDORSEMENT OF A CHECK BY A PERSON OF THE SAME, OR SLMILAR.
NAME TO THAT OF THE PAYEE - KECK V BROWNE
In the recent Kentucky case of Keck v. Browne,' the court was faced with the
problem of determining which of three parties should bear the loss caused by a
forged check. Ben Browne, who resided at 461 Woodlawn Avenue, Lexington,
was employed by John Keck, Commissioner of Highways of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky. Prior to the formation of the contract, Keck had corresponded with
Browne at his home address. The contract, however, did not contain the street
address. After services had been rendered, a check in the amount of $3,949.92
was drawn, payable to Ben Browne. The check was mailed with the following
address, "Ben Browne, Lexington, Ky." The Lexington Post Office delivered the
check to Ben Brown, 561 McKinley Street, Lexington. The recipient endorsed
and presented the check to a local merchant who was acquainted with Brown.
The merchant, not being able to cash such a large check, went with the forger
to the First National Bank and Trust Co., of Lexington. The statement of facts
is ambiguous but apparently this bank was a mere paying bank and not the
drawee. Although Brown was not known at the bank, the merchant was, and upon
Ins identification of Brown as Browne, the check was okayed by the teller and a
vice-president of the bank. Brown absconded, and, when the forgery was sub-
sequently discovered, the bank refused to stand the loss. Held: the loss must fall
on the drawer, the Commonwealth, rather than on the First National Bank, or
on the payee, the real Ben Browne.
This case is an interesting example of the problem presented when the
drawer of a check, or other negotiable instrument, attempts to deliver the check
to the named payee, but, in some way, the check gets into the hands of another
person with the same, or a similar, name. This other person then endorses the
check, and cashes it before the error can be detected. Upon whom must the
loss fall?
Most courts have said that an indorsement by a person having the same
name as the payee constitutes a forgery.- Thus, at first glance, it might seem
that the loss would fall on the bank cashing the check. However, this may or
may not be true, depending upon the nature of the fact situation. As pointed
out by Professor Britton,3 there are three basic fact situations in which the
problem may arise. The first is where the instrument falls into the hands of the
third person by virtue of an act over which the drawer has no control. An ex-
ample of this would be in case of a theft. Here, the loss falls upon the person
who takes the instrument from the forging payee.' The second category is one
-in which the third person gets the check solely because of the act of the drawer.
This is best illustrated by the leading American case of Slattery & Co. v. National
City Bank.' There the drawer had dealings with H. E. Richards of Rockdale,
Texas, and with Harold E. Richards of Bartlesville, Oklahoma. The check in
question was mistakenly sent by the drawer to the party in Texas, instead of
the one in Oklahoma. The check was forged, and the loss was placed upon
the drawer. The third category may be termed the "in-between" group, i.e.,
1314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W 2d 188 (1950).
BarrrON, BILLS AND NoTEs 726 (1948).
2 Ibid.
'Ibid.i114 Misc. 48, 186 N. Y. S. 679 (N. Y. City Cts. 1920).
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where there was a negligent act on the part of the drawer, combined with
either a negligent act on the part of the drawee or the paying bank; or an
intervening act which contributed to the acquisition-of the check by the third
person; or a combination of several or all of the above possibilities.
American courts, guided by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, have
developed a rather standard rationalization of and solution to the general prob-
lem. The relevant part of the statute is section 28:
"When a signature is forged or made without the authority
of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inopera-
tive, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge there-
for, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto,
can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority."8
This statutory provision codifies the general rule of the Law Merchant that when
there is a forged instrument, no title passes, and the drawer of the instrument
cannot be held for the loss. As stated previously, the effect of this is to place the
basic liability for a forged check upon the paying bank.
By the wording of the statute, it can be seen that "the party against whom
it is sought to enforce such right" may be "precluded from setting up the forgery."
This is simply a way of stating that the court may work an estoppel upon the
drawer, if the loss has been occasioned by his conduct. Thus, the application of
the estoppel doctrine presents an exception to the general rule. The troublesome
question is to determine what conduct on the part of the drawer is sufficient to
invoke an estoppel.
The Kentucky court, in deciding the principal case, relied mainly upon the
estoppel exception. In discussing the rule, the court had this to say, " where one
of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he whose conduct en-
abled such third person to occasion the loss, must sustain it. "' Applying this rule
to the facts of the case, the court said, "In the first place, the imposter had to
obtain possession of the check before he could forge it. Who made this pos-
sible? Is it not obvious that it was the failure of appellants [Keck] properly to
address the envelope contaimng the check?"9 The court also relied heavily on
the well known Kentucky case of Citizens Unon National Bank v. TerrilU," say-
ing that the facts of this case were "substantially" similar to that one, in which
the estoppel rule was applied. It is submitted that in holding that the act of
the Commonwealth in leaving off- the street address of the recipient was suffi-
cient to estop it, the court fell somewhat short in its application of the basic
rules of estoppel. It is fundamental that the negligence necessary to set up any
estoppel must be in the transaction itself," and that mere general carelessness
is not sufficient.' It is said that there must be a duty owing from the person
'Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 856.028 (1948).
'Kentucky Title Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266
S.W 667 (1924); 9 C. J. S. 788; note, 21 TENN. L. REv. 816 (1950).
8814 Ky. 151, 155, 284 S.W 2d 188, 185.
9 Id. at 156, 284 S.W 2d, at 185.
"244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W 2d 60 (1982).




estopped to the other person,"' and that the act of the person being estopped
must be the proximate cause of the loss." Furthermore, the rule of estoppel is
held to be inapplicable where two parties are equally culpable, or when the
party asserting the estoppel has been contributorily negligent."
It will be noted that when the check was delivered to the Lexington Post
Office, that office delivered the letter to the wrong man. Was not this act a
type of intervening negligence? If it was, the negligence of the drawer may
not have been the proximate cause of the loss.' It may be argued that the pay-
ing bank was also negligent. Note that the name of the forger was Brown, while
the name of the payee was Browne. Was the means of identification used by
the drawee bank sufficient? It would seem not, for they relied on the word of
a local merchant, who himself may have been careless in making sure Brown
was the true payee.'" Nowhere in the facts is it shown that the bank asked for
any written identification, which would have revealed the discrepancy in spell-
ing. Surely such is not a reasonable business practice, especially in view of the
fact that Browne was a regular customer of the bank," and the fact that it was
such a large check. Thus, it appears that the negligence of the bank was at
least equal to, and probably greater than, the negligence of the drawer. If so,
the paying bank should not have been able to invoke the estoppel.'
As previously noted, the court stated that the facts of the present case
were "substantially" within the facts of the Terrill case. An examination of this
case shows that the cases are easily distinguishable. Terrill, a master commis-
sioner, had in his possession certain money that was due to Joe Cunningham,
who resided in Louisville. Prior to sending the check in question, there had
been correspondence concerning the matter with the wrong Joe Cunningham,
also in Louisville. The imposter had kept up the exchange of letters, and by
virtue of this correspondence, he had induced Terrill into sending him the check.
This case also involved the rights between the drawer of the check and a pay-
ing bank. The drawer was held estopped. It seems obvious that in the Terrill
case there was no question of any negligence, other than on the Dart of the
drawer. Furthermore, the improper mailing by the drawer, Terrill, was due
to the inducement by the forger through the means of the prior correspondence.
There had been no prior corresporidence with the wrong party in the Keck case,
and it is said that in cases of such prior dealings, the forger gets title because
" Vecchia v. Fidelity Union Trust Co. 114 N. J. L. 470, 177 At. 429 (1935).
" Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Central Co-op Ass n, 201 Minn. 425, 276 N.W
731 (1937); 19 Am. Jun. 694.
'Stark v. Stephens, 76 Colo. 440, 233 Pac. 619 (1925).
"Blue Grass Tam Garage Co. v. Shepherd, 304 Ky. 390, 200 S.W 2d 936
(1947); 21 C. J. 1170.
' Cf. Blue Grass Taxi Garage Co. v. Shepherd, supra, note 16.
"
8 Brief of Appellants, p. 40.
"Id. at 25.
It is worthy of note that Ben Browne, the payee, may have been negligent,
so as to enable the Commonwealth to invoke an estoppel against him. Although
he had had prior correspondence with Keck, in which his street address appeared,
the contract had the same address as that put on the check (brief of appellants,
p. 24). It might be argued that the drawer of the check could rely on this ad-
dress. Such a proposition would also tend to show a lesser degree of negligence
on the part of the drawer at least toward the payee. In the case of Jung v. Sec-
ond Ward Savings Bank, 55 Wis. 392, 18 N.W 235 (1882), the payee, Phillip
Jung, in Germany, directed the drawer to mail a draft to lum at "Weisbaden,
Germany "The court held that so addressing the draft was not an act of negligence.
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of an "intent" on the part of the drawer." The Terrill case would seem to fall
within the second group set out, i.e., where the act of the drawer was the sole
cause of the loss.
The fact situation in the main case clearly falls into the "in-between" group.
The solution of the problem in such a case depends largely upon the legal effect
of the acts of the drawer, payee, and drawee. The court must determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to invoke an stoppel. It is submitted that in the
Keck case, the facts were not sufficient to eston the drawer, and that the loss
should have been placed, on the paving bank.
ROBERT F STEPHENS
IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE-
HALE V HALE
The doctrine of imputed negligence, originated in the English case of
Thorogood v. Bryan,' is said to be based upon the idea that such a relationship
may exist between an injured person and another that it would be inequitable
to permit the injured person to recover where the other party to the relationship
was negligent. Can it be said that under this theory the marital relationship,
standing alone, is sufficient for the imputation of negligence of one spouse to
another? This very question was raised in the recent Kentucky case of Hale
v. Hale.-
In that case, a child was killed when, due to the negligent driving of her
father, the station wagon in which the family was riding went over an embank-
ment. Suit was brought against the father by the admimstrator of the child's
estate, for the benefit of the mother. Defendant's demurrer was sustained in
lower court; the Court of Appeals reversed. There were two grounds of de-
fense. The first, the common law disability of one spouse to sue another. was
disposed of by the court with the observation that the Kentucky Constitution'
expressl, provides that the action may be maintained in every case by the
administrator of the decedent, and for the benefit of those named m the statute.'
The second defense, and the one in which we are primarily interested, was that
the negligence of the father should be imputed to the mother, so as to bar re-
covery for the benefit of the mother by the child's adminstrator. Plaintiff con-
tended that the sounder and more modern rule is that negligence will not be
imputed on the basis of the marital relationship alone. The Court of Appeals,
in discussing the problem said:
"The question of imputed negligence is not a new one,
the decisions in this state and elsewhere are somewhat in conflict.
The better rule is that negligence is not to be imputed by reason
of the marital relation alone."'
"BnrroN, BiLS AND Nom~s 720 (1943).
18 C. B. 115, 18 L. C. P. 336 (1849); See Keeton, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 13 TEx. L. REv. 161 (1935).
312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W 2d 610 (1950).
'Ky. CoNST. sec. 241.
'Ky. REv. STAT. see. 411.130 (1948).
'Supra, note 2, at 870.
